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BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
ARCHIBALD COX AND THE GENIUS OF OUR
INSTITUTIONS
FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE*
I am confident that historians will write that the trend of decisions during
the 1950's and 1960's was in keeping with the mainstream ofAmerican history
- a bit progressive but also moderate, a bit humane but not sentimental, a bit
idealistic but seldom doctrinaire, and in the long run essentially pragmatic - in
short, in keeping with the true genius of our institutions. 1
In the dedication of his classic work Democracy and Distrust2 to Chief
Justice Earl Warren, the late John Hart Ely wrote "You don't need many
heroes if you choose carefully." 3 For several generations of lawyers and legal
academics, Archibald Cox was a hero. We chose him carefully and we chose
him easily.
Archie Cox was one of my heroes long before I became his colleague when
I joined the Boston University Law Faculty in 1988. In the spring of 1973 he
had been appointed Special Prosecutor to investigate charges of wrongdoing
by officials of President Nixon's Committee to Re-Elect the President with
respect to the break-in at the Democratic Party National Committee Watergate
offices. The mere six months he spent in that position saw him forever etched
in time as the paragon of integrity and courage. I was a freshman in college
during that fall. I vividly recall sitting in a dorm room with a group of friends
on the night of October 20, known thereafter as the "Saturday Night
Massacre." A group of friends in a dorm room, likely as not talking about the
Watergate crisis that continued to dominate the news with a seemingly new
extraordinary development each day, were astonished when another of our
number burst in to say that he had just heard on the radio that President Nixon
has fired Attorney General Elliot Richardson, Deputy Attorney General
William Ruckelshaus, and the Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox.4
* Law Alumni Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. © 2005.
My appreciation to my colleague Andrew Kull for his careful reading and thoughtful
comments, and to Jordon Scott, a member of the Boston University School of Law class of
2006, for his research assistance.
I ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF REFORM 133-34 (1967).
2 JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)
3 Id. at v (dedication).
I In fact, President Nixon had accepted the resignation of Richardson; there is some
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At the center of the events that culminated in the Saturday Night Massacre
were the celebrated White House Watergate tapes, sought both by Cox and the
Senate Watergate committee. On the previous night - as we later learned -
Cox had refused to accept an arrangement worked out between the President
and the Senate Committee by which the White House would not turn over the
tapes but rather summaries of their contents. Nixon thereupon ordered Cox not
to make any further efforts to obtain the tapes. Cox refused. He informed the
President of the United States that he could not comply with his direct order.
It is only with benefit of hindsight that it appears as if things all had to come
out the way they did. The following June, the Supreme Court would order
Nixon to turn over the tapes; 5 in August, Nixon would resign the Presidency.
Cox had no way of knowing in October 1973 that his decision to stand firm in
the face of a Presidential directive would be so thoroughly, splendidly, and
quickly vindicated. His decision was based instead on two outstanding traits of
his character: his integrity and his belief in the American people and their
system of justice. When he was appointed as Special Prosecutor, Cox had told
the Senate Judiciary Committee that he would pursue the Watergate matter
wherever it led, even to the office of the President.6 On the night of the
Saturday Night Massacre itself, he said "Whether ours shall continue to be a
government of laws and not of men is now for Congress and ultimately the
American people. ' '7
It would be hard to overstate how inspirational Cox's words, courage and
commitment were to that group of college freshmen that night. Several of us
went on to become lawyers. I am sure that similar scenes were played out all
across the country that night, and indeed around the world. Cox had
demonstrated that values such as integrity and love of country were paramount
and abiding, even in the face of a Presidential order. He had also demonstrated
that at times of great crisis for their country, lawyers had a critical role to play.
Lawyers, asserting and upholding the rule of law, were essential for orderly
social change, and for the defense of a system of rights and liberties in the face
of powerful challenges. Law was not merely an honorable profession; it was a
vital calling that could place one at the epicenter of great events. Cox had
become our hero.
I first met Archie fourteen years later. After retiring from his extraordinary
career at Harvard Law School, he had begun in 1984 what would turn out to be
another impressive teaching career of thirteen years at the Boston University
School of Law. When I met him in the fall of 1988 he was already a well-
dispute as to whether, as White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler maintained,
Ruckleshaus was fired, or, if as Ruckleshaus himself stated, he too resigned. Solicitor
General Robert Bork, who then became acting Attorney General, fired Cox.
5 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
6 See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1987).
7 Carroll Kilpatrick, "Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit,"
WASH. POST Oct. 21, 1973, p. Al.
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established figure in the classroom and the faculty lounge at BU. He was
generous with his time, a careful and insightful reader of drafts of our articles,
and an engaging and thoughtful participant in conversation, not only with the
most senior among us, but with a first year member of the faculty as well. In
his second teaching career with us at BU, he was not only a valued colleague,
but, as ever, an inspirational and accomplished teacher. Through his final
semester with us, in the fall of 1996, he received strong student evaluations.
"It has been an honor to study under Professor Cox. This class has been a
unique experience that I'll be grateful for having long after I graduate," wrote
one student. Another stated that "The professor's enthusiasm (and humility) in
conveying the intricacies of Constitutional Law certainly inspired and made for
a much more rigorous class, where students were internally motivated to
answer questions / examine the ambiguities." Perhaps most revealing and
striking about the student evaluations for Cox's last Constitutional Law class in
1996, half a century after he began teaching, was this: for "instructor's level of
preparation for class," Archie received a 4.9 out of a possible 5.0. A
consummate professional who asked no more of others than he was prepared to
do himself, he was a deeply dedicated teacher throughout his long career. In
this regard too, he was our hero.
In describing the Warren Court, Archie Cox in many ways provided us with
his own epitaph. He wrote of a time in which the Supreme Court was at the
forefront of most social movements in the United States in the quarter century
following the Second World War. The Court's influence was deeply felt on
matters of race relations, civil rights and civil liberties; the very contours of
what it means to be a member of the American polity. Its opinions probed for
the proper role of law enforcement in a free society, the proper means by
which a democratic institution elected its officials and governed itself, and the
proper allocation of powers between a Federal Government bent on enforcing
federal rights and constituent State governments that were sometimes resistant
of that trend. As scholar, teacher, and for over five years Solicitor General,
Cox himself played a significant role in this entire movement. I would say of
Archie what he himself, with characteristic concision and grace, said of the
Warren Court: that the trend of his life work "was in keeping with the
mainstream of American history - a bit progressive but also moderate, a bit
humane but not sentimental, a bit idealistic but seldom doctrinaire, and in the
long run essentially pragmatic - in short, in keeping with the true genius of our
institutions."'8





We all of us have personal memories of Archibald Cox. I often fell in with
him early in the morning. As I rode my scooter up to the Law Tower, he
would be making his way afoot from his truck. I remember watching him
brave the fierce breeze on Commonwealth Avenue clad only in that scruffy
blue windbreaker he used to wear. He would read his newspaper in the faculty
common room before ducking back to his desk to prepare (copiously) for class.
Archie wrote out his notes longhand on legal-size yellow pads. When the Law
School decided to put computers in faculty offices, I stopped by to ask what
model he preferred. Archie gazed at me for a minute, searched for just the
right words, and then explained ever so graciously that he really didn't want
one of those gadgets at all. At his age, he said, he had decided to spare himself
the bother of some modem "conveniences." A supply of pens and yellow pads
would suit him perfectly well.
Archie spent long hours in the building, discussing ideas great and small
with faculty colleagues, but mostly making himself available to students. Once
when I was working late, I looked up to find him at my door asking if I wanted
to run out for a sandwich. He had arrived at his usual early hour and was now
waiting around until the middle of the evening to listen to a first-year moot
court argument. Over the sandwiches, I wondered whether the students would
appreciate what he was giving them. I hope and trust they did. Archie enjoyed
those sessions as much as class. He loved oral argument and everything about
it-the challenge of pounding complex ideas into a form that could be
intelligible in conversation, framing issues, organizing a coherent presentation,
and, above all, anticipating questions and formulating answers.
I confess that I took advantage of Archie. When I was writing one of my
own appellate briefs, preparing for an argument, or trying to develop an article,
I routinely asked what he thought and tailored my efforts to his response. I
remember in particular his reaction to one draft brief. I thought the argument
was complicated, and I had worked very hard to capture its details. Truth is, I
was pretty proud of myself when I left the draft on his chair. The next
morning, standing at the coffee pot, Archie said he had digested what I had
written pretty well and thought he understood where I wanted to go. But, no,
he really couldn't "argue it that way." It had to be simpler, something on the
order of "two-plus-two-equals-four." I had to understand, he explained, that
the justices knew very little about the issues, really. I had to reach them at the
level of common sense. I swallowed my pride and started over.
I was shameless in stealing examination questions from Archie. He always
got started long before I did, then passed his questions to me both to see what I
* Professor of Law, Boston University.
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thought and (mostly) to let me use them rather than preparing my own. It was
in connection with exams that I had my best glimpse of Archie's approach to
constitutional law. I was puzzling over one of his questions, trying to decide
whether it would give students a chance to bring some fancy theoretical model
to bear. Archie shrugged and said he really had nothing of the sort in mind.
He said he was a "case man" and meant that he had little interest in the kind of
academic abstractions on which so many of us concentrate these days. He only
wanted students to grapple sensibly with problems that might actually occur in
the world. He wanted them to think in the way that good lawyers and justices
think, shaping arguments and counterarguments bearing on the case at hand
and on similar cases that might arise in the future. As I think back on it now, I
only hope my own aims for what we were doing were half so ambitious.
Others report that Archie exercised a conservative or, better said, a prudent
influence as Solicitor General. He shared Robert Kennedy's political values
and goals, but he was unwilling simply to promote that agenda in the form of
legal argument. He understood well enough that law, particularly
constitutional law, is constantly changing underfoot. And he was perfectly
content to help the Court move things along. Yet he preferred incremental
progress and hesitated to advocate quantum leaps from the past. For example,
he was uncomfortable with the arguments he offered in Baker v. Carr9 and
Reynolds v. Sims.10 Of course, he later concluded that the decisions in Baker
and Reynolds were perfectly appropriate, even godsends. Still, he regarded
constitutional law as more neutral, independent, and autonomous than many of
us now believe it to be. To Archie, law was not an instrument by which
private actors seek advantage, but rather an institution by which the
community develops peaceably. Or maybe Archie was only less cynical (and
more hopeful) about our ability to live with each other under a common public
law.
When the occasion called for it, Archie was prepared to offer a bold
argument meant to establish new and better holding ground. I was thinking in
that vein only last year when the Supreme Court held in Grutter that race may
validly play a role in law school admissions.'" The only precedent in view was
Bakke. 12 I am just old enough to remember the successful argument advanced
by the University of California back then. It was careful, measured, and
eminently sensible. And it was presented, of course, by Archibald Cox. It
may be, it just may be, that the result in Grutter was made possible by Archie's
wise original counsel, which had only gathered strength with time and
reflection.
Shortly after he resigned his position as Solicitor General, Archie wrote a
9 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
1 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
12 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Foreword for the Harvard Law Review. 13 It's remarkable now to read his
words and to appreciate the power of his insights. The Warren Court's then-
recent decisions, rendered on the basis of Archie's arguments, established
beyond question that constitutional adjudication can and should promote
human freedom. Archie hailed both the Court's decisions recognizing personal
constitutional rights and its decisions sustaining Congress' power to enact
federal civil rights legislation grounded in Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Sadly, the latter decisions must be contrasted with cases in
which the modem Court has drastically curtailed Congress' authority. I didn't
ask Archie what he thought of the Rehnquist Court's curbs on federal civil
rights law. But I can imagine his thinking. Let my last words here be the
words Archie used to begin his Foreword a quarter century ago: "Once
loosed," he wrote, "the idea of Equality is not easily cabined."'14
STEVEN M. ZIOLKOWSKI*
"It's a hard book, but it's the best book." That's what I recall Professor Cox
saying about our Constitutional Law casebook. The broader import of those
words has obvious relevance as an approach to living, and I imagine that is
how Professor Cox approached his own life: with courage, never turning away
from a task because it was difficult but accepting the challenge, not for its own
sake but because it was the right thing to do. How else would one explain his
confrontation in 1973 with those in power for the greater good at the expense
of his own career in government? Fortunately, after the "Saturday Night
Massacre" Professor Cox returned to the profession of teaching law, a decision
from which many law students, including me, benefited greatly.' 5
13 Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966).
14 Id. at 91.
* Mr. Ziolkowski took constitutional law with Archibald Cox at Boston University
School of Law during the first semester of 1992-93, and received his Juris Doctor summa
cum laude in May 1994. Mr. Ziolkowski currently practices commercial litigation as
Counsel with Lowenstein Sandier PC, in Roseland, New Jersey, and he lives in Greenwich
Village, New York City.
"s Archibald Cox took over the Watergate investigation of the Nixon Administration on
May 18, 1973, and was dismissed 5 months later by Robert H. Bork on the President's
orders in what is known as the "Saturday Night Massacre." Professor Cox then returned to
his previous profession of teaching, first at Harvard Law School and eventually at Boston
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When it came time to apply for a particular class for Constitutional Law, I
felt that there was no choice other than to request the course taught by
Archibald Cox. What an opportunity, to be able to learn from a person who
actually lived some of this nation's most important cases, which explains the
numerous references to "Archie" or "Cox" in the margins of my casebook!
Professor Cox brought a personal side to his teaching not only as a
consequence of this experience, however, but also as a result of his emphasis
on the more personal aspects of the law. For example, it was not the more
formal "Roe versus Wade," 16 but "Roe against Wade" or "Roe and Wade,"
subtle but important distinctions that reminded me that these cases that
implicated issues of national significance were, at first and at bottom, real
disputes involving real people. It is a lesson that, when put into practice, has
helped me serve my clients well.
As Professor Cox grew older he also became more soft spoken; I believe our
class was the first to ask him to wear a microphone, and he kindly obliged so
we could hear every word. And that is how I ultimately remember Archibald
Cox, as a thoughtful man, dedicated to imparting his vast wealth of knowledge
and wisdom.
The book has now closed on Professor Cox's life. The meaning of his
words should also bear on how we look at his story and what we can learn
from it, full of difficult pages but with both his and our lives being the better
for his having gone through them. Thank you, Professor Cox, for showing us
how to learn and grow from using only the best book no matter how hard. It
really is the only way.
University School of Law.
16 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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